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“Big Brother” in the Private Sector
PRIVACY THREATS UNDER THE FAA’S NEW
CIVILIAN DRONE REGULATIONS
INTRODUCTION
With the advent of a mass market for civilian drones in
the United States on the horizon, cybersecurity concerns
regarding potential data misappropriation are greater than ever
before. These concerns were compounded in 2015 when the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)1 released a draft of small,
unmanned aerial vehicle (drone) regulations for public notice and
comment, which, notably, did not include any privacy provisions.2
Following the FAA’s issuance of proposed regulations, the
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), along with a
number of other privacy advocacy organizations, commenced a
legal action against the FAA, which ultimately sought to force the
FAA to include privacy provisions in its new drone regulations.3
EPIC’s petition was dismissed as premature in May of 2016 by
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which held that only
final regulations may be challenged, and the regulations at issue
were still in draft form.4 Soon after the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the
FAA announced that it had promulgated a final version of these
regulations, which took effect on August 29, 2016.5 EPIC

1 The Federal Aviation Administration—created by the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958—is a federal agency charged with regulating all civil aviation in the United
States. What We Do, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/about/mission/activities/
[https://perma.cc/7JL6-HES2].
2 See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80
Fed. Reg. 9544 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45, 47, 61,
91, 101, 107, 183).
3 See Petition for Review, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 821
F.3d 39 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 31, 2015) (No. 15-1075), https://epic.org/privacy/litigation/apa/faa/
drones/EPIC-v-FAA-DC-Cir-Petition.PDF [https://perma.cc/4UBK-E8YG] [hereinafter First
EPIC Petition for Review].
4 See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 821 F.3d 39, 43–44
(D.C. Cir. 2016).
5 Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., New FAA Rules for Small Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Go Into Effect (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/
news_story.cfm?newsId=20734 [https://perma.cc/LWC7-7WCR].
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proceeded to commence a new lawsuit against the FAA,
challenging these final drone regulations.6
Because the D.C. Circuit dismissed EPIC’s concerns as
premature during the FAA’s drafting stage, which allowed the
FAA to promulgate final versions of the regulations as currently
drafted, the privacy invasion concerns that were voiced will
likely become a reality faster than the rulemakers can respond.
With effective legal status, civilian drones will overwhelm our
skies, capturing data on a massive scale—data that will
subsequently become exposed to hackers.7 The now-inevitable,
wide-scale deployment of civilian drones presents numerous
unique and serious problems that the United States is currently
ill equipped to handle.
This note provides a criticism of the FAA’s new drone
regulations with a focus on their disregard for the privacy
threats they present. More specifically, it analyzes the privacy
concerns presented by civilian drones’ vulnerability to hackers.
Part I provides background on the growth of the domestic
civilian drone industry, the various threats to individual
privacy stemming from this growth, and the current state of
the law with regard to civilian drone use. Part II analyzes
privacy concerns unaddressed by the current legal landscape
for civilian drones, with a specific focus on the ability of drones
to capture and retain sensitive data that is vulnerable to
hackers. Part III discusses the current scope of the FAA’s new
small civilian drone regulations, and EPIC’s legal challenges to
the existing regulations as representative of various other civil
rights organizations. Finally, Part IV suggests a solution to the
major problems posed—identifying potential ways to effectively
integrate civilian drones into domestic airspace without
eroding the privacy rights of American citizens. First, Congress
should amend the existing statute that mandates the FAA to
develop drone regulations—or pass a separate statute—to
explicitly require that the regulations include privacy protections.
Then, after receiving an express grant of congressional authority,
the FAA should repeal its current drone regulations, revise them
to include privacy provisions, and reopen the revised regulations
for public commentary. Statutory action by Congress would force
6 See Petition for Review, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., No.
16-1297 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 22, 2016), https://epic.org/privacy/litigation/apa/faa/drones/EPICPetition-08222016.pdf [https://perma.cc/57J6-5GDV] [hereinafter Second EPIC Petition
for Review].
7 See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Comments on Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking: Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems 1–2, 13–
15 (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2015-0150-4314
[hereinafter EPIC Comments].
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the FAA to issue significant new regulations that adequately
quell the large-scale privacy threat presented by civilian drones.
I.

CIVILIAN DRONE USE IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS
IMPACT ON PRIVACY RIGHTS

A.

The Birth and Development of the Civilian Drone Industry

Largely attributable to globalization and society’s
headfirst dive into the digital age, technological advancement has
occurred at an exponential pace in modern history, with some
sources estimating that computer processing ability currently
doubles every twelve to eighteen months.8 The most recent wave
of innovation occurred seemingly overnight, with the development
of weaponless drones designed for use outside of the military
context by both individuals and commercial entities. MerriamWebster defines “drone,” as used here, as “an unmanned aircraft
or ship guided by remote control or onboard computers.”9
Unmanned aerial aircrafts have been in use by the military in
some capacity for more than one hundred years, with the first
recorded military “drone” use dating back to 1849, when the
Austrian military deployed approximately two hundred unmanned
balloons into Italy.10 The first true drones were introduced in World
War I to carry bombs to a preset destination.11 Today, the United
States military uses remotely controlled drones for a range of
purposes, from scouting and reconnaissance to the elimination of
enemy targets.12 Civilian drones are a much more recent
innovation; the FAA only approved the use of civilian drones in
the United States in 2013.13

8 See THE EMERGING FUTURE, ESTIMATING THE SPEED OF EXPONENTIAL
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT (2012), http://theemergingfuture.com/docs/SpeedTechnological-Advancement.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQ8V-CZJ2].
9 Drone, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/drone
[http://perma.cc/U85X-BKZG].
10 See Hugh McDaid et al., Remote Piloted Aerial Vehicles: An Anthology,
MONASH UNIV., http://www.ctie.monash.edu/hargrave/rpav_home.html#Beginnings [https://
perma.cc/L27P-N7VJ].
11 Jimmy Stamp, Unmanned Drones Have Been Around Since World War I,
SMITHSONIAN (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/unmanneddrones-have-been-around-since-world-war-i-16055939/?no-ist [https://perma.cc/ET9J-JM2T].
12 See Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles
(UCAVs) and Drone Aircraft, MILITARY FACTORY, http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/
unmanned-aerial-vehicle-uav.asp [https://perma.cc/5XC5-F4ZR] (listing different types of
military drones and their uses).
13 See Joan Lowy, FAA Certifies First 2 Drones for Domestic Flight, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB. (July 26, 2013), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-faa-certifiesfirst-2-drones-for-domestic-flight-2013jul26-story.html [https://perma.cc/THS2-AGSG].
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The transition from expensive, modern military drones,
like those deployed by the United States,14 to affordable drones
available for civilian and commercial use has spurred the
growth of a new global industry containing heavyweight
competitors15—one recently valued at approximately $8 billion.16
As a result, civilian drone development has been occurring at a
rapid pace in the United States, and rulemakers have struggled
to keep up.17 Although civil and commercial drone sales currently
comprise only about 3.8% of the drone industry,18 several
predictions forecast that this dynamic will shift substantially.19
While other nations have been utilizing civilian drones for
years,20 and have developed or are developing corresponding
regulations to ensure the safe assimilation of drones into their
airspaces, the United States’ legislative process has been
outpaced by technological advancement in this arena.21 The
commercial drone age is only just beginning and the already
unprecedented capabilities of these unmanned aerial vehicles
will continue to develop as the industry matures.
Civilian drones already on the market have advanced
capabilities, including extremely high-definition live feed and
recording cameras, infrared ray and heat sensors, and global
positioning systems that can track a high volume of targets
over a long range.22 Further, many of these devices are designed

14 For instance, the MQ-9 Reaper—a commonly used United States military
drone—reportedly costs $12,548,710.60. Drones, TIME (Nov. 6, 2012), http://nation.time.
com/2012/11/06/12548710-60/ [https://perma.cc/26W2-BX7L].
15 See Fintan Corrigan, Big Money Investing in Drones Giving Sector Real
Momentum, DRONEZON (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.dronezon.com/drone-companiesnews-interviews/investing-in-drones-gives-sector-real-momentum/ [https://perma.cc/7M
AC-CAGE].
16 Jack Nicas & Douglas MacMillan, After Fresh Investment, Chinese Drone
Maker DJI Valued at About $8 Billion, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinesedrone-maker-dji-raises-75-million-from-accel-partners-1430915407 [https://perma.cc/NL9
V-GYNU] (last updated May 6, 2015).
17 See BOB HAZEL & GEORGES AOUDE, OLIVER WYMAN, IN COMMERCIAL
DRONES, THE RACE IS ON: AVIATION’S FASTEST-GROWING SECTOR OUTPACES US
REGULATORS 3 (2015), http://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-wyman/global/en/
2015/apr/Commercial_Drones.pdf [https://perma.cc/JTV6-EEFC].
18 BILL CANIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44192, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS (UAS): COMMERCIAL OUTLOOK FOR A NEW INDUSTRY 6 (2015).
19 Id. at 7 (citing The Drones Report: Market Forecasts, Regulatory Barriers, Top
Vendors, and Leading Commercial Applications, BUS. INSIDER INTELLIGENCE (May 27,
2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/uav-or-commercial-drone-market-forecast-20152 [http://perma.cc/WS7Z-F7LR]).
20 For example, in Japan, drones have been utilized for many years in an
agricultural context, and in Canada, they have been used by law enforcement to perform
search-and-rescue missions. See HAZEL & AOUDE, supra note 17, at 3.
21 Id.
22 See EPIC Comments, supra note 7, at 5.
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to be used as a foundation for additional applications.23 This
allows civilians to use drones in a variety of different contexts,
ranging from land surveying24 to celebrity stalking.25 The
sophisticated tools with which civilian drones are equipped do
not provide any significant threat to individual privacy on their
own but the privacy threat exists because these capabilities are
compounded with their small size, affordability, and exposure
to hackers. With available models small enough to fly close to
the ground to gather images and information, and affordable
enough to be given as holiday gifts, the time may soon come
when the most significant invasions of personal privacy are not
perpetrated by the NSA, but rather the hobbyist next door. Add
drones’ vulnerability to hackers into the mix,26 and the need for
clear and uniform drone-specific privacy regulations becomes
apparent. In light of civilian drones’ dramatic rise, the current
regulatory environment civilian drones operate within—at both
the state and federal level—inadequately addresses the unique
and unprecedented privacy threats presented by the
widespread use of these unmanned vehicles.
B.

Current State and Federal Regulations

In order to effectively convey the privacy concerns
presented by the federal regulatory environment in which drones
operate, it is necessary to provide an overview of the interactions
between state and federal law in this area. Academics,
policymakers, and civil liberties organizations disagree as to
whether the authority to regulate drone privacy should fall
within federal or state domain.27 Many proponents for a state-

23 Some
of these many applications include: aerial photography and
cinematography, wildlife monitoring, mapping, police investigation, and emergency
response. See, e.g., AERYON LABS INC., http://aeryon.com/ [https://perma.cc/HVB2-W3TG];
AEROVEL, http://aerovelco.com/Flexrotor.html [https://perma.cc/PM64-2F84]; Phantom,
DJI, http://www.dji.com/product/phantom/.
24 See Surveying & Mapping, 3D ROBOTICS INC., https://3dr.com/enterprise/
industries/survey-mapping/ [https://perma.cc/K27Q-SXT4].
25 See Justin Peters, Good News for Kanye West: California Bans Paparazzi
Use of Drones to Spy on Celeb Homes, SLATE (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
future_tense/2015/10/09/california_bans_paparazzi_use_of_drones_to_spy_on_celebritie
s_at_home.html [https://perma.cc/8LPY-BG2C].
26 Christian de Looper, Drones Now Big Hacking Target, First Drone
Malware Identified, TECH TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/3063
4/20150204/drone-hacking-next-big-security-concern.htm [https://perma.cc/UZ9J-72TP].
27 See, e.g., Robert A. Heverly, The State of Drones: State Authority to Regulate
Drones, 8 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 29, 47 (2015) (arguing that the relatively local nature of
drone flight favors state regulation); Margot Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian
Drones and the Things They Carry, 4 CALIF. L. REV. 57 (2013) (advocating for state
regulation of civilian drones); Domestic Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Drones,
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centric approach base their arguments on the notion that
individual privacy laws have traditionally fallen within the
province of the states and that states have a robust common
law system governing the invasion of privacy.28 They further
argue that in this early stage of civilian drone privacy
regulation, states are in the best position to assume the guinea
pig role in experimenting with different types of laws, allowing
the federal government to follow a wait-and-see approach.29
Conversely, leaving drone privacy regulation exclusively within
the province of state law has already led to the development of
piecemeal laws that vary between states; some argue a federal
uniform baseline is necessary to protect the privacy interests of
all Americans.30 Additionally, as many civilian drones will
likely operate across state lines, particularly in the commercial
context, significant variations in state laws will burden
interstate operators. The regulation of civilian drones in United
States airspace is clearly in the domain of the FAA—an agency
of the federal government—and such power to regulate should
necessarily extend to protecting against the privacy threat
drones present.
1. Inadequacy of the State Law Landscape
The current state law schemes vary state-by-state and
do not contemplate or adequately address many of the new and
unique threats posed by drones.31 Some states provide their
residents with general privacy protections under both common
law and statutes, typically covering violations such as trespass
and certain invasions of an individual’s right to privacy.32
Because civilian drones are such a recent innovation, most
state privacy laws specific to trespass by aerial vehicles do not
consider the prevalent existence of civilian drones and, instead,
focus on traditional, manned aircrafts. Similarly, privacy
invasion by civilian drones has received little consideration by
ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/drones/ [https://perma.cc/AV8R-WP65]
(maintaining the position that the federal government must regulate drone privacy).
28 See WELLS C. BENNETT, BROOKINGS INST., CIVILIAN DRONES, PRIVACY, AND
THE FEDERAL-STATE BALANCE 4 (2014), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/
Files/Reports/2014/09/civilian-drones-privacy/civilian_drones_privacy_bennett_NEW.pdf?
la=en [https://perma.cc/AW7Y-8QHT].
29 Id. at 6.
30 See Sarah Breitenbach, States Rush to Regulate Drones Ahead of Federal
Guidelines, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/
research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/09/10/states-rush-to-regulate-drones-ahead-offederal-guidelines [https://perma.cc/6Y5L-W578].
31 See BENNETT, supra note 28, at 4.
32 Id. at 5.
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courts.33 While many states have proposed or enacted legislation
concerning civilian drone use in certain niches, such as
“requir[ing] law enforcement to get a probable cause warrant
before using a drone in an investigation,”34 comprehensive state
laws have been slow to develop.35
As of March 2017, thirty-five states had enacted laws
regulating civilian drone use within their state borders, but
most laws are related to the safety of drone operation, rather
than privacy concerns (e.g., a number of state laws make it
illegal for drones to interfere with emergency first responders).36
Further, most of the states that do have drone-specific privacy
regulations apply them exclusively to government entities, such
as law enforcement.37 There are exceptions however, as there are
some states that do have drone-specific privacy regulations that
apply to private actors.38 Florida is one of these exceptions,
having recently enacted a law that prohibits “a person, a state
agency, or a political subdivision from using a drone to capture
an image of privately owned real property . . . if a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists.”39 In California, an existing general
privacy statute was amended—expanding the offense from
knowing invasions of land to include aerial trespass—in
response to widespread paparazzi drone use.40 While there are
certainly arguments to be made for a state-centric approach to
drone-specific privacy regulation, the failure of states to take
this initiative underscores the need for a uniform federal
baseline. To comprehensively highlight the deficiencies in the
legal framework that civilian drones operate within, it is
necessary to also consider the federal legal landscape.

See Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155, 158 (2015).
Allie Bohm, Status of 2014 Domestic Drone Legislation in the States, ACLU
(Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/blog/status-2014-domestic-drone-legislation-states
[https://perma.cc/PQ8W-CYC3] (footnote omitted).
35 See id.
36 Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 20, 2016), http:// www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/currentunmanned-aircraft-state-law-landscape.aspx [https://perma.cc/CHL6-6AUC].
37 For example, Utah restricts where law enforcement—not civilians—may
operate drones and collect data. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63G-18-101, 63G-18-102, 63G18-103, 63G-18-104, 63G-18-105 (West 2016); see also BENNETT, supra note 28, at 2–3
(discussing law enforcement as the target of much state drone privacy legislation).
38 See RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43965, DOMESTIC
DRONES AND PRIVACY: A PRIMER 26 (2015).
39 Surveillance by a Drone Act, S.B. 766, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015)
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 934.50 (2015)).
40 Assemb. B. 856, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).
33

34
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2. Current Status of Federal Law
At the federal level, the legal status of civilian drones in
the United States is somewhat murky but evolving quickly. In
response to the emergence of the civilian drone market, Congress
passed an enabling statute, known as the FAA Modernization and
Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA), directing the FAA to promulgate
regulations to allow for the safe and effective integration of
civilian drones into American airspace.41 In relevant part, Section
332 commands the FAA to integrate “civil unmanned aircraft
systems in the national airspace,” and includes requirements for
the FAA’s development of comprehensive planning, rulemaking,
testing, and reporting to Congress; Section 333 provides the FAA
authority to issue exemptions based on specifications it shall
determine (e.g., size and weight), and decide whether a certificate
of airworthiness is necessary for an exemption to be issued;
Section 334 requires administrative guidance and rule
development for drones operated by public agencies; Section 335
requires the FAA to conduct safety studies on drone operation;
and Section 336 prohibits the FAA from regulating model
aircrafts that are flown recreationally and satisfy other defined
qualifications.42 The FMRA gave the FAA until September 30,
2015 to “provide for the safe integration of civil unmanned
aircraft systems into the national airspace system.”43
In June 2016—nearly a year after the deadline Congress
imposed on the FAA to safely integrate civilian drones into
United States airspace—the FAA promulgated a set of final
regulations governing nonmilitary drone operation in the United
States that did not contain any provisions related to privacy.44
These final regulations were the subject of substantial contention
in their draft phase and remain at the center of an active lawsuit,
discussed in Part III.45 Prior to the FAA’s issuance of new
regulations, civilian drone use in the United States was illegal as
a general matter but allowed in some circumstances under
various FAA exemptions.46 There were multiple ways an operator
might receive an exemption: as a recreational operator flying a
41 There are six sections in the FMRA’s provisions related to unmanned aircraft
systems, Sections 331 to 336, which are located in Subtitle B of Title III. See FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (amending 49
U.S.C. § 40101).
42 Id.
43 Id. § 332(a)(3), 126 Stat. at 73.
44 See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 14
C.F.R. § 107 (2016).
45 See infra Part III.
46 See THOMPSON II, supra note 38, at 5.
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drone that is designated a “model aircraft” under Section 336 of
the FMRA;47 with a certification of airworthiness under the
FAA’s limited “experimental” designation;48 or by falling into an
industry the FMRA permits the FAA to exempt for specified
purposes.49 The FAA issued over 5500 exemptions under Section
333 of the FMRA alone50 to organizations that use drones in
industries such as “agricultur[e], real estate, film and broadcasting,
oil and gas, and construction activities.”51 Under these legal
exemptions, many companies developed and marketed drones for
civilian use prior to their general legalization.52 The current uses
and potential future uses for civilian drones in the United States
are abundant—ranging from use by the general public looking for
a more advanced remote control toy to use by major corporations
for agriculture, geographic imaging, and cinematography.53
With commercial drone use already widespread across
many industries based on the FAA’s issuance of exemptions, the
industry is poised to grow quickly now that commercial drone
use is explicitly legal. Major companies such as Amazon and
Google hope to eventually operate commercial drones designed
to fly out-of-sight for functions such as package delivery to
consumers’ homes and street-level geographic imaging.54 While
the FAA currently forbids such “beyond-sight” drone flights, it
has opened the door to the possibility of testing this type of
usage, likely because of pressure from powerful companies like
Amazon and Google.55
Former President Barack Obama also demonstrated his
concern with the privacy implications of government and civilian
drone use, issuing a Presidential Memorandum on that topic
directed to all agency heads.56 Addressing governmental entity
drone use, the memorandum required that “agencies shall, prior
to deployment of new [unmanned aircraft system (UAS)]
technology and at least every 3 years, examine their existing UAS
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 5 (citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.191, 21.193, 91.319 (2012)).
49 Id.
50 Authorizations Granted Via Section 333 Exemptions, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/section_333/333_authorizations/ [https://perma.c
c/95ZY-SXXP].
51 CANIS, supra note 18.
52 See id. at 9–11.
53 Id.
54 Jack Nicas, Amazon, Google See Shift in Regulatory Stance on Commercial
Drones, WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-google-see-shiftin-regulatory-stance-on-commercial-drones-1430864309 [https://perma.cc/T9NK-PH2T].
55 Id.
56 Memorandum on Promoting Economic Competitiveness While Safeguarding
Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems,
2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Feb. 15, 2015).
47
48
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policies and procedures relating to the collection, use, retention,
and dissemination of information obtained by UAS, to ensure that
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are protected.”57 The
memorandum proceeded to impose numerous specific requirements
upon these agencies in accordance with that mandate.58 In its
second section, the memorandum addressed privacy concerns
associated with civilian drone use, although it provided less
specificity in this regard.59 It stated that “a multi-stakeholder
engagement process to develop and communicate best practices
for privacy, accountability, and transparency issues regarding
commercial and private UAS use in the NAS” must be instituted
by the Department of Commerce “[w]ithin 90 days.”60 Acting in
accordance with this directive, the National Telecommunications
and Information Administration worked with various
stakeholders to develop a brief guidance document for civilian
drone operators, which it issued in May of 2016.61
While this guidance document encourages drone
operators to follow “voluntary best practices” to protect the data
gathered by their drones, it is far from comprehensive at only
eight pages, and does not have the binding effect of law. The
potential impact of this document is reduced further under the
safe assumption that most civilian drone operators will not seek
out or read its text. Although President Obama’s memorandum
and the corresponding guidance document illustrate the prior
administration’s concern with the current state of federal drone
laws, these documents’ ultimate impact will be limited without
the support of the current administration. Additionally, because
the guidance document does not have the force of law that
promulgated regulations do, the enumerated “voluntary best
practices” will likely have little impact on the behavior of drone
operators. The importance of drone privacy regulation—
highlighted by the prior administration’s focus on it—supports
the need for regulation rather than just guidance.
II.

WIDESPREAD DRONE LEGALIZATION WITHOUT
ADEQUATE PRIVACY SAFEGUARDS

Upon promulgating the final regulations as drafted, the
FAA granted effective legal status to drones, spawning
Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 2–3.
59 Id. at 1–2.
60 Id. at 3.
61 See NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR
UAS PRIVACY, TRANSPARENCY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2016).
57

58
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exponential growth of the civilian drone market. As previously
mentioned, the market for civilian drones is forecasted to grow
at an annual rate of 19% for the next five years.62 That
expansion, absent any federal privacy regulation, will quickly
lead to catastrophic results. Specifically, because today’s drones
are able to fly so low to capture and retain large amounts of
sensitive information with unprecedented technology, and are
now becoming common place on such a large scale, they will be
vulnerable targets to hackers who can misappropriate that
sensitive information.
The advanced and developing technological capacity of
civilian drones—discussed in Section II.A below—makes the
privacy threat presented by their widespread legalization and
deployment a problem of significant proportion that is not
adequately addressed by current legislation. The severity of this
threat becomes clear when one makes two related considerations:
(1) the advanced capabilities civilian drones already have or will
have in the future that allow them to gather different types of
sensitive information and; (2) the vulnerability of this information
to misappropriation by hackers, as discussed in Section II.B.
A.

The Technological Capacity of Civilian Drones

Civilian drones already on the market are equipped with
top-of-the-line video and audio recording technology.63 Now that
civilian drones have been legalized on a wide scale, more
advanced models could come equipped with much greater
capabilities in the near future.64 These technologies will work
together to give civilian drones unmatched surveillance ability.65
One particularly menacing capability that civilian
drones will likely be equipped with in the future is facial
recognition software.66 Today, advanced facial recognition
technology is very much a reality and is currently under
development for application in a range of different areas. In
China, for example, facial recognition technology has been
successfully programmed into ATM machines so the unique
62 Nicas, supra note 54 (citing The Drones Report: Market Forecasts, Regulatory
Barriers, Top Vendors, and Leading Commercial Applications, supra note 19).
63 See, e.g., Seamus Payne, 7 High Tech Drones for Sale Today, THE COOLIST
(May 1, 2013), http://www.thecoolist.com/7-high-tech-drones-for-sale-today/ [https://perma.
cc/44UY-HUVK].
64 For example, there are already civilian drones that are equipped with
advanced video cameras capable of facial recognition being marketed to hobbyists. See,
e.g., HOVER CAMERA, https://gethover.com/shop/product/hover-camera [https://perma.cc/
LS34-6DNK].
65 See EPIC Comments, supra note 7, at 5.
66 Id.
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facial features of individuals withdrawing money can be
matched with photos contained in the computer’s database.67
Certain international airports in the United States have also
recently begun employing facial recognition technology to identify
counterfeit passports.68 Without diving deeply into the functions
that enable machines to recognize faces, the technology can be
divided into two categories—facial recognition based on features
(geometric) and facial recognition based on appearance
(photometric).69 In 2001, facial recognition technology was
advanced significantly by computer scientists who developed
an algorithm that could identify different faces based on
variations of light on different parts of the human face.70 In
2015, a new algorithm was developed that had the ability to
quickly and accurately detect individual faces in a large crowd
from many angles.71 And now, software with that programming
has been added to the arsenal of technology being built into
civilian drones.72
The U.S. military has already developed and programmed
highly advanced autonomous drones with facial recognition
software that can be used to identify and track targets over long
ranges.73 If domestic law enforcement agencies begin implementing
similarly advanced facial recognition technology, it is not difficult
to imagine the realistic possibility that any individual’s activity
could be subject to drone surveillance, absent comprehensive
federal laws restricting such drone use. Outside the government
context, drones with facial recognition technology may be utilized
for the purpose of gathering unique information on large numbers
of people without their consent, which could then be used in
67 See Hannah Osborne, China Unveils World’s First Facial Recognition ATM
Machine, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 31, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/china-unveils-worldsfirst-facial-recognition-atm-machine-1503706 [http://perma.cc/3SVC-GV5K].
68 See Andrea Noble, U.S. Airports to Roll Out Facial-Recognition Software to
Catch Fake Passports, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2016/jan/21/us-airports-roll-out-facial-recognition-software/ [https://perma.cc/6EBT-XMNA].
69 See FBI, FACE RECOGNITION, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_
biometrics/biometric-center-of-excellence/files/face-recognition.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2
CE-VS7G].
70 See Lisa Vaas, Breakthrough in Facial Recognition: The ‘Deep Dense Face
Detector’, NAKED SEC. (Feb. 19, 2015), https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/02/19/break
through-in-facial-recognition-the-deep-dense-face-detector/ [https://perma.cc/FN6B-P7HG].
71 Id.
72 See Justin Lee, Public Drones Equipped with Facial Recognition Software
Raise Privacy Concerns, BIOMETRIC UPDATE.COM (May 7, 2015), http://www.biometric
update.com/201505/public-drones-equipped-with-facial-recognition-software-raise-privacy
-concerns [https://perma.cc/6WLS-CJ78].
73 See Matthew Rosenberg & John Markoff, The Pentagon’s ‘Terminator
Conundrum’: Robots That Could Kill on Their Own, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/10/26/us/pentagon-artificial-intelligence-terminator.html [http://
perma.cc/Z4WF-CCVT].
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combination with existing data for a variety of purposes, such as
advertisement targeting. This may seem benign enough,
particularly considering that there are already technologies
employed by marketers to gather identifying user information on
the Internet.74 Yet, a fleet of drones armed with advanced facial
recognition technology and other complementary capabilities
could be used to provide information about civilians at a much
greater level of detail—a level that would make most people
uncomfortable. While the prospect of providing legitimate entities
new windows into our personal lives is itself disconcerting, the
more significant threat stems from illegitimate uses of this
technology—e.g., perpetrating crimes like identity theft.
Many civilian drones currently on the market now come
factory-equipped with 4K cameras, which record images and
video in ultra high definition.75 The ability to capture such
high-resolution footage allows drones to conduct surveillance
from great heights76 without being noticed by potential targets.
And while this functionality could prove beneficial for use in
law enforcement77 and other areas, it could also be used to spy
on individuals without their knowledge. Considered in light of
widespread drone legalization, the prospect of many civilian
drones possessing exceptional surveillance ability becomes
daunting.78 The vulnerability of advanced civilian drones to
misappropriation by hackers exponentially increases the privacy
threat such drones present.
B.

Vulnerability to Hackers

In its comment on the FAA’s draft drone regulations,79
and again in its recent argument to the D.C. Circuit, EPIC
mentioned the risk posed by hackers who can obtain sensitive

74 See E.J. Schultz, Facial-Recognition Lets Marketers Gauge Consumers’
Real Responses to Ads, ADVERTISING AGE (May 18, 2015), http://adage.com/article/
digital/facial-recognition-lets-marketers-gauge-real-responses/298635/ [https://perma.cc/Q
8EV-B94B].
75 See Fintan Corrigan, 4K UHD Video Drones Creating Waves in Aerial
Cinematography, DRONEZON (Oct. 18, 2016), http://www.dronezon.com/aerial-photo-andvideo/aerial-filming/4k-ultra-high-definition-video-drones-creating-waves-in-aerial-cinemato
graphy/ [https://perma.cc/4XNK-4GS9].
76 See Stephan Jukic, The Powerful Potential of 4K Cameras in Crime
Detection, 4K (Dec. 1, 2014), http://4k.com/news/the-powerful-potential-of-4k-cameras-incrime-detection-4335/ [https://perma.cc/ZMW5-E5DC].
77 See id.
78 It is not difficult to imagine some of the illegitimate uses of drone surveillance
technology, ranging from recording conversations intended to be private, to targeting and
stalking individuals for violent purposes.
79 See EPIC Comments, supra note 7, at 13–15.
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information from drones.80 Citing a report that analyzed the
drone hacking research of Todd Humphreys,81 EPIC argued
that this risk is due, in large part, to the relative ease with
which drones can be hacked.82 Humphreys has received
substantial recognition for his expertise in GPS technology,
and has even delivered a TED Talk83 on how a GPS can be
manipulated.84 The Department of Homeland Security took
interest in his research, which demonstrated the ease with which
a drone’s GPS can be hacked. At the Department’s request,
Humphreys provided a live demonstration, where he hacked into
a drone’s GPS and commandeered it.85 Humphreys’s
demonstrated expertise in manipulating drone technology
captured the attention of Congress. In March of 2015, Humphreys
was called to testify about the threat of drone hacking before the
House Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency of
the Committee on Homeland Security.86
The report cited by EPIC stated that “Humphrey[s]
demonstrated to Homeland Security agents that [by] spending
around $1,000 on equipment and designing an application able
to send signals to the drone’s GPS receiver he is able to gain
complete control of the vehicle.”87 Humphreys continued: “[I]f
you can commander the GPS unit, then you can basically spoon
feed false navigation information in the navigation center of
80 See Brief for Petitioner at 9–10, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Fed. Aviation
Admin., 821 F.3d 39 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 28, 2015) (No. 15-1075), https://epic.org/privacy/
litigation/apa/faa/drones/1575326-EPIC-Opening-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CXT-B9TZ]
[hereinafter EPIC Opening Brief].
81 Humphreys is an Associate Professor of Engineering at the University of
Texas at Austin where he also directs the Radionavigation Laboratory. See Todd E.
Humphreys, UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, https://www.ae.utexas.edu/faculty/faculty-directory/
humphreys [https://perma.cc/QPX3-2EVD]. His research focuses on robotics, controls, and
orbital mechanics. Id.
82 See EPIC Opening Brief, supra note 80, at 9–10 (citing Pierluigi Paganini,
Hacking Drones . . . Overview of the Main Threats, INFOSEC INST. (June 4, 2013), http://
resources.infosecinstitute.com/hacking-drones-overview-of-the-main-threats/ [https://perma.
cc/TYL7-CKFP]).
83 TED—an acronym for Technology, Entertainment, and Design—“is a
[global] nonprofit devoted to spreading ideas, usually in the form of short, powerful
talks.” Our Organization, TED, http://www.ted.com/about/our-organization [https://perma.
cc/3B33-4C2R].
84 Todd Humphreys, TED, https://www.ted.com/speakers/todd_humphreys
[https://perma.cc/6CD5-ZDAN].
85 See Todd Humphreys’ Research Team Demonstrates First Successful GPS
Spoofing of UAV, UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN AEROSPACE ENG’G & ENG’G MECHANICS
(June 28, 2012), http://www.ae.utexas.edu/news/504-todd-humphreys-research-teamdemonstrates-first-successful-uav-spoofing [https://perma.cc/HS22-EMZ4].
86 See Todd Humphreys to Testify Before U.S. Congress on UAV Threats,
UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN AEROSPACE ENG’G & ENG’G MECHANICS (Mar. 17, 2015),
https://www.ae.utexas.edu/news/820-humphreys-congress-testimony-2015 [https://perma.
cc/H4MK-BLDX].
87 Paganini, supra note 82.
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these drones.”88 Hijacking drones in this way is known as “GPS
spoofing” and involves intercepting the GPS signals they emit.89
Various studies have been conducted on the GPS spoofing of
drones,90 and four professors of computer science have
published a step-by-step manual detailing how to conduct this
type of attack on both civilian and military drones.91 One
prominent member of the international robotics community
even stated that “[i]t’s easy to spoof an unencrypted drone.”92
Although “easy” is relative, an ordinary civilian likely does not
possess the technical expertise to successfully hack a drone,
though a few individuals with malicious intent could present
an extraordinary threat. Even heavily encrypted United States
government data is not hack-proof.93 Thus, it does not take an
abundance of creativity to imagine the risks posed by datacarrying civilian drones, including the potential capture and
distribution of unauthorized surveillance video and identity
misappropriation.
As EPIC highlighted in its brief, “[w]hen a drone is
hacked, it can provide access to pictures, recorded or live feed
video, or other sensitive personal information.”94 Taking this a
step further, it is not a stretch to envision governmental actors
from adversarial nations or extremists unconcerned with
American laws using this relatively simple hacking method to
access civilian drones. And while the prospect of U.S. enemies
commandeering civilian drones flying over domestic skies
presents obvious direct safety threats, if those individuals were to
acquire massive quantities of data from civilian drones in large
scale and coordinate information attacks, the security of the
United States as a nation could be put in jeopardy. The
vulnerability of drones to hacking has even been evidenced on
multiple occasions in a military context. In 2009, Iraqi
insurgents, using readily available software, successfully gained
Id. (quoting Humphreys).
See id. at 9.
90 See, e.g., Andrew J. Kerns et al., Unmanned Aircraft Capture and Control
Via GPS Spoofing, 31 J. FIELD ROBOTICS 617 (2014); Daniel P. Shepard et al., Evaluation
of Smart Grid and Civilian UAV Vulnerability to GPS Spoofing Attacks, 5 INT’L J.
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 146 (2012).
91 See Nils Ole Tippenhauer et al., On the Requirements for Successful GPS
Spoofing Attacks, CCS ‘11 PROC. 18TH ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY,
Oct. 17–21, 2011, at 75.
92 Paganini, supra note 82 (quoting Noel Sharkey, cofounder of the International
Committee for Robot Arms Control).
93 See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Hacking of Government Computers Exposed
21.5 Million People, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/us/
office-of-personnel-management-hackers-got-data-of-millions.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/
A34L-UWH5].
94 See EPIC Opening Brief, supra note 80, at 10.
88
89
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access to unencrypted live video from U.S. Predator drones.95 In
2011, Iran captured a U.S. spy drone, which it alleged was a
result of spoofing the drone’s heavily encrypted GPS (although
the United States has maintained that the drone’s crash landing
and capture was caused by a mechanical error).96 Then, in 2013,
Iran released footage it alleged to have recovered from the
drone.97 Considering that hackers have gained access to
expensive and heavily protected military drones on several
reported occasions, individuals hostile to the United States can
likely access the much less protected civilian drones flying in
U.S. airspace.98
Because many lawful civilian drones will capture and
retain private and potentially dangerous information, their
exposure to individuals skillful enough to gain access to their
operating systems presents major risks to U.S. safety and privacy.
III.

PRIVACY IGNORED: EPIC’S MULTIYEAR LEGAL BATTLE
AGAINST THE FAA AND THE FAA’S AGGRAVATION OF
EPIC’S PRIVACY CONCERNS

A.

EPIC’s 2012 Petition, the FAA’s Subsequent Civilian
Drone Regulations, and the Resulting Lawsuits

Following Congress’s passage of the FMRA in 2012,
privacy and civil liberties organizations vocalized their concerns
with the act. Soon after the FMRA was enacted, EPIC and
numerous other organizations dedicated to civil liberties, human
rights, technology, and consumer rights sent a petition to the
FAA requesting that the FAA “address the threat to privacy and
civil liberties that will result from the deployment of aerial
drones within the United States.”99 In this petition, EPIC and
other represented organizations identified specific threats to
privacy stemming from the widespread commercialization of
95 See Siobhan Gorman et al., Insurgents Hack U.S. Drones—$26 Software Is
Used to Breach Key Weapons in Iraq; Iranian Backing Suspected, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17,
2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB126102247889095011 [https://perma.cc/8ZPM-LG9M].
96 See Gordon Corera, Iran Shows ‘Hacked US Spy Drone’ Video Footage,
BBC (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-21373353 [https://perma.
cc/6M95-9SY5].
97 Id.
98 For example, Mexican drug cartels have been reportedly crossing the
United States-Mexico border with ease by hacking into and diverting nonmilitary
drones utilized by the United States Border Patrol. See Waqas Amir, US Border Patrol
Drones Hacked by Drug Cartels, HACKREAD (Jan. 3, 2016), https://www.hackread.com/
us-border-patrol-drones-hacked-by-drug-cartels/ [https://perma.cc/U8UD-UQNF].
99 See Petition from EPIC, et al. to the United States Federal Aviation
Administration, at 1 (Feb. 24, 2012) [hereinafter EPIC Petition to the FAA].
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drones, highlighting that these drones are “designed to undertake
constant, persistent surveillance to a degree that former methods
of aerial surveillance were unable to achieve.”100
The petition starts by acknowledging that civilian drone
use is growing in the United States, and then transitions to
briefly discussing the “[s]ubstantial [t]hreats to [p]rivacy”
posed by drones in light of the industry’s growth.101 The petition
identifies the unparalleled domestic surveillance capabilities
possessed by drones as its foremost threat, which can “provide
real-time video streams at a rate of 10 frames a second.”102 It
raises further concerns with drones’ ability to track multiple
targets over a long range using advanced technology such as
“infrared cameras, heat sensors, GPS, sensors that detect
movement, and automated license plate readers.”103 These
capabilities allow drones to obtain a wide range of data,104 which
would become vulnerable should a drone equipped with some or
all of these capabilities fall into the hands of a hacker.105 The
petition also conveys that the privacy threat presented by the
unique capabilities of drones is heightened by their ability to
“operate undetected in urban and rural environments.”106
Based on these concerns, EPIC requested the agency
take action in the form of “a notice and comment rulemaking”
period in relation to the privacy implications of private and
government use of civilian drones in the United States.107 It
then suggested that the primary privacy considerations of that
rulemaking period should be “the use and retention of data
acquired by drone operators; the relation between drone
Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
102 Id. (quoting U.S. Army Unveils 1.8 Gigapixel Camera Helicopter Drone, BBC
NEWS (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16358851 [https://perma.cc/U
V83-Q6WN]).
103 EPIC Petition to the FAA, supra note 99, at 2–3.
104 Equipped with the proper technology, drones can be used to obtain massive
amounts of data for a variety of purposes, ranging from topographic mapping to accident
investigation for insurance providers. For a discussion of some of the various applications
of data-capturing drones, see Stuart Thornton, Data Drones, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (May 5,
2014), http://nationalgeographic.org/news/data-drones/ [https://perma.cc/9DQW-X7EN].
105 Many technology experts familiar with drone technology voice similar
concern over drones’ exposure to being hacked. See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, Hacker Says
He Can Hijack a $35K Police Drone a Mile Away, WIRED (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.wired.
com/2016/03/hacker-says-can-hijack-35k-police-drone-mile-away/ [https://perma.cc/KW22XFFH]; Mary Shacklett, Drones Collecting Big Data Present New Security and IT
Concerns, TECHREPUBLIC (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/dronescollecting-big-data-present-new-security-and-it-concerns/ [http://perma.cc/TZ9X-95Q4].
106 EPIC Petition to the FAA, supra note 99, at 3 (quoting Jennifer Lynch, Are
Drones Watching You?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 10, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deep
links/2012/01/drones-are-watching-you [https://perma.cc/2SFH-4Q8X]).
107 Id. at 5.
100
101
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operation and property rights; the ability of an individual to
obtain a restraining order against a drone vehicle; and use
limitations on drone vehicles and requirements for enforcement
of those limitations.”108 If the FAA were to consider these
aspects, it would necessarily focus much more acutely on the
potential privacy implications of civilian drone legalization.
The FAA denied this petition and stated that privacy
issues raised by EPIC and the petition’s other signatories are
“not an immediate safety concern.”109 The FAA then proceeded to
draft the FMRA-mandated regulations without incorporating
provisions related to EPIC’s privacy concerns110 and posted them
for public comment in February of 2015.111 The comment period
closed two months later.112 The drafted rules focused entirely on
conventional safety issues presented by the legalization of
drones for private use, setting weight, height, and speed limits
for these unmanned aerial vehicles.113 These rules also proposed
a licensing program for drone operators, subject to oversight by
the Transportation Authority Administration, and enumerated
other restrictions on drone operation, including a ban on flying
drones outside the operator’s line of sight.114 In overwhelming
response to the FAA’s posting of these proposed rules, more than
4500 comments were received.115 EPIC was among these
commentators, posting a seventeen-page comment with arguments

Id.
Letter from Lirio Liu, Dir. of Office of Rulemaking for the Fed. Aviation
Admin., to Marc Rotenburg, EPIC Exec. Dir., & Amie Stepanovich, EPIC Nat’l Sec.
Counsel (Nov. 26, 2014), https://epic.org/privacy/drones/FAA-Privacy-Rulemaking-Letter.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2E3R-PPQY].
110 See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80
Fed. Reg. 9544, 9544–51 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43,
45, 47, 61, 91, 101, 107 & 183).
111 Operation
and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems,
REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2015-0150-0017
(last visited June 13, 2017).
112 Id.
113 See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80
Fed. Reg. at 9546, 9551–52.
114 Id. at 9546–47.
115 Of the six major rules the Department of Transportation (DOT) and its
agencies have issued since the start of 2015, the FAA’s rule governing the operation of small
unmanned aircraft systems received the most commentary in its proposal stage—more than
twice as many comments as the second most commented-on major rule issued by the DOT
in that span. For a list of the DOT’s major rules, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
http://www.gao.gov/legal/congressional-review-act/ (select “Department of Transportation”
in the “Agency” dropdown; then select the “Major” button next to the “Rule Type” category;
then input the relevant date range for the “Date Published in the Federal Register”
category, inputting a start date of 01/01/2015; then click “Search”). For a quantification
of the comments on each major FAA regulation since the start of 2015, see Operation
and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, supra note 111.
108
109
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in support of their position that the FAA should amend these rules
to include comprehensive privacy provisions.116
In March of 2015, prior to the FAA’s closure of the
notice and comment period for these draft regulations, EPIC,
along with various other privacy organizations, initiated a civil
action against the FAA in the United States Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit.117 This petition essentially argued that the
FAA was legally mandated to regulate privacy in its drone rules
and, consequently, EPIC requested that the court require the
FAA to revise its proposed regulations.118 Within two months,
the FAA moved to dismiss this suit.119 In the motion, the FAA
took the position that EPIC’s lawsuit was premature, as no final
rule had yet been issued.120 The FAA also refuted EPIC’s claim
that its request to initiate a new rulemaking was improperly
denied, arguing that EPIC’s request was brought too late, as it
was not filed within the required sixty-day time frame.121 After a
round of briefing and argument by both parties,122 the D.C.
Circuit granted the FAA’s motion to dismiss in May of 2016.123
The D.C. Circuit left the door open for EPIC to renew its
challenge after the FAA’s issuance of final rules, resting its
decision on well-established law that only final agency rules are
reviewable by a court.124
Following the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the FAA acted
promptly in promulgating the final regulations without any
privacy provisions, which became effective on August 29,
2016.125 Without wasting any time, EPIC renewed its challenge
in the D.C. Circuit—now attacking the final regulations.126

EPIC Comments, supra note 7, at 1.
See Daniel Wilson, Aerospace and Defense Cases to Watch in 2015’s 2nd Half,
LAW360 (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/687030/aerospace-and-defensecases-to-watch-in-2015-s-2nd-half [https://perma.cc/8DUB-VXME].
118 See First EPIC Petition for Review, supra note 3, at 2.
119 Motion to Dismiss, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 821 F.3d
39 (D.C. Cir. May 15, 2015) (No. 15-1075), https://epic.org/privacy/litigation/apa/faa/drones/1
552818-Motion-to-Dismiss.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR7C-7KS5].
120 See id. at 2.
121 Id.
122 EPIC filed its opening brief on September 28, 2015. See EPIC Opening Brief,
supra note 80. On November 4, 2015, the FAA filed its opposition papers. See Brief for
Respondents, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 821 F.3d 39 (D.C. Cir. Nov.
4, 2015) (No. 15-1075), https://epic.org/privacy/drones/epicvfaa/1581988-FAA-Brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XP6D-L5V2] [hereinafter FAA Opposing Brief].
123 See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 821 F.3d 39 (D.C.
Cir. 2016).
124 Id. at 44.
125 See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 14
C.F.R. § 107 (2016).
126 See Second EPIC Petition for Review, supra note 6, at 1.
116
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Weighing the Parties’ Respective Legal Positions

In considering the likely outcome of this now pending
action, a brief assessment of the legal positions of the opposing
parties is helpful. Academics have made persuasive arguments
that the enabling statute, as written, does not provide the FAA
authority to regulate drone privacy.127 By its plain language,
the FMRA covers only drone safety, and does not mandate that
the FAA take drone privacy issues into account in their
regulations. Like many federal statutes, it is broad and
categorical, giving the FAA significant flexibility in determining
exactly what provisions are necessary to safely integrate civilian
drones into national airspace. In summary, the FMRA directs
the FAA to “‘define the acceptable standards of operation and
certification’ of drones and to ‘establish standards and
requirements for operator[s] and pilot[s]’ of drones, as well as
identify ‘the best methods to ensure safe operation’ of drones in
the [National Airspace System].”128 The FAA has interpreted this
mandate as applying only to conventional airspace safety, meant
to prevent casualties that could result from collisions with
manned aircraft vehicles or inanimate objects.129 In contrast,
EPIC has maintained the position that “safety” should be more
broadly interpreted to include the protection of individual privacy
rights.130 It is not implausible that Congress’s failure to include
explicit privacy language was intentional—perhaps there was
concern about infringing on First Amendment protections, or
there simply was not enough bipartisan support.
While the basis of EPIC’s position—that a lack of
privacy provisions in the FAA’s drone regulations could present
major problems—is difficult to dispute, its arguments based on
the statutory construction of the FMRA and legislative intent
may not prevail. In its initial brief, EPIC took the position that
the FAA’s failure to include privacy considerations in its
rulemaking was an error of law and in violation of its
congressional mandate.131 In response to EPIC’s brief in the prior
action, the FAA argued that EPIC’s substantive claims had no
127 See Marc Jonathan Blitz et al., Regulating Drones Under the First and
Fourth Amendments, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 50 (2015) (“The Agency, however, would
likely need further congressional action before it can restrict UAV flight based on privacy
rather than safety concerns.”).
128 EPIC Comments, supra note 7, at 2–3 (first and second alterations in original)
(quoting FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(1)(A), 126
Stat. 11, 73).
129 See FAA Opposing Brief, supra note 122, at 14–18.
130 See EPIC Comments, supra note 7, at 7–8, 10–15.
131 See EPIC Opening Brief, supra note 80, at 24.
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merit as the FAA acted well within its authority in determining
that it was not provided any congressional directive to include
privacy protections in its regulations.132
In interpreting the FMRA, EPIC focused on the word
“comprehensive” in the section stating that “[t]he FAA ‘shall
develop a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate the integration
of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace
system.’”133 EPIC argued that Congress consciously decided to use
the word “comprehensive” and, in doing so, intended the broad
language to encapsulate both safety and privacy considerations.134
Although EPIC’s statutory interpretation is logical, it faces an
uphill battle in making this argument in light of the broad
deference granted to agency rulemaking under the Chevron
doctrine.135 Under Chevron, courts first consider Congress’s
expressed intent in interpreting a statute, and must adhere to
that intent.136 If Congress is silent as to a particular ambiguous
issue, courts will grant an administrative agency wide interpretive
latitude if the agency’s interpretations are “based on a permissible
construction of the statute,” a relatively low bar.137 Further, as the
FAA pointed out, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court
instructed courts to apply greater deference to an agency’s
inaction—like the FAA’s refusal to promulgate privacy-specific
drone regulations—than they would to an agency’s affirmative
actions.138 Thus, EPIC may have difficulty overcoming the
deferential standard applied to administrative agencies like the
FAA in interpreting statutes they are charged with
administering. And if the D.C. Circuit does not side with EPIC in
its renewed civil action against the FAA, prompt congressional
action will be required to force the FAA to promulgate new drone
privacy regulations.
C.

Augmented Threat Under the Proposed Regulatory
Framework

In the event of the FAA’s success on the merits in the
renewed EPIC v. FAA action, the final regulatory framework it
has issued for civilian drones—which sidesteps the privacy
concerns outlined in the previous section—will remain in effect.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 34 (emphasis omitted) (quoting FAA Modernization Act § 332(a)(i)).
134 See id. at 35.
135 See Chevron USA v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
136 Id. at 842–43.
137 Id.
138 See FAA Opposing Brief, supra note 122, at 11 (citing Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527–28 (2007)).
132
133
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The FAA justified the absence of privacy provisions from its
regulations by maintaining that drone privacy issues are beyond
the scope of the rulemaking authority it has been conferred by
Congress, and that it has acted within the bounds of its
delegated discretion in denying EPIC’s 2012 petition.139 In that
denial, the FAA emphasized that, in considering the relative
insignificance of the privacy issues raised by EPIC, and its
limited available resources, regulating drone privacy concerns is
not a priority.140
The new regulatory framework provides current market
leaders the legal stability necessary to vastly increase their
civilian drone production and has opened the gates for many
new companies to enter the market. Heightened competition
will continue to increase the speed of innovation in the
industry and new technology will be implemented faster than
lawmakers can respond. If EPIC’s renewed suit is decided in
favor of the FAA, and the FAA is not otherwise required to
regulate drone privacy, any remaining uncertainty in the
market will be eliminated, and its growth will occur unfettered.
Although a robust civilian drone market may prove beneficial to
the U.S. economy, privacy violations and data misappropriation
may begin to occur on an unparalleled scale as this market
grows without federal drone privacy regulation. Unless Congress
and the FAA change course and take substantial preventative
measures, the United States will be unprepared to effectively
counteract and address major data breaches that occur.141
IV.

A MULTITIERED SOLUTION

A top-down legislative approach requires Congress to be
vigilant in either amending the FMRA, as it currently exists, or
enacting new legislation requiring the FAA to include privacy
provisions in its regulations. Prior to that action being taken,
Congress should exercise its legislative authority to force the
FAA to repeal its existing small civilian drone regulations, thereby
reinstituting a temporary ban on non-exempted civilian drones.
Once a congressional mandate to regulate drone privacy is in
place, the FAA will face pressure to revise its drone rules quickly
See id. at 5–6.
See Letter from Lirio Liu, Dir. of Office of Rulemaking for the Fed.
Aviation Admin., to Marc Rotenburg, EPIC Exec. Dir., & Amie Stepanovich, EPIC Nat’l
Sec. Counsel, supra note 109 (“After reviewing your request, we have determined that
the issue you have raised is not an immediate safety concern.”).
141 Such data breaches are not speculative. For example, drug cartels have
hacked United States Border Control drone data so traffickers are able to discretely
cross the United States-Mexico border. See Shacklett, supra note 105.
139
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to allow the civilian drone market to resume its growth. This
section suggests the particular content of these privacy provisions.
A.

Congressional Enabling Statute

Although Congress did not expressly mandate that the
FAA include privacy provisions in its FMRA regulations, it
does not change the importance of privacy protections prior to
widespread drone legalization. Accordingly, the first step in
averting a potential crisis requires a command from Congress,
in the form of either an amendment to the FMRA or a new
statute, that the FAA include comprehensive privacy
protections in its regulations.
Congressional action that has already been taken
indicates that the privacy threat presented by the widespread
legalization of civilian drones is on the mind of at least some
legislators.142 Senator Ed Markey and Representative Peter Welch
have sponsored numerous subsequent bills to address drone
privacy concerns, albeit to little avail.143 Notably, the Drone
Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2015 sought to amend
the FMRA to direct the Secretary of Transportation to study and
identify “any potential threats to privacy protections posed by the
integration of unmanned aircraft [drone] systems into the
national airspace system.”144 It would have also mandated
“procedures to ensure that the integration of unmanned aircraft
systems into the national airspace system is done in compliance
with privacy principles.”145 These bills have yet to become law,
but their sponsors are not giving up in their pursuit of amending
the FMRA. In March of 2017, Senator Markey and
Representative Welch reintroduced their bicameral legislation.146
To effectively initiate reparation, Congress will need to
engage in a bipartisan effort and seriously consider the drone
privacy bill already before them. The Drone Aircraft Privacy
Act of 2017 is explicit in its instructions and comprehensive in
its scope. It seeks to add numerous sections to the FMRA
including one that would require the Secretary of Transportation
to establish rules that account for privacy concerns.147 The bill also
142 See, e.g., Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2015, S. 635,
114th Cong. (2015); Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2015, H.R. 1229,
114th Cong. (2015).
143 Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2015, S. 635.
144 Id. § 3.
145 Id.
146 Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2015, S. 631, 115th
Cong. (2017).
147 Id. § 3.
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provides some guidance on privacy considerations that should be
made in the new rules, specifically regarding data collection
restrictions, drone operator disclosure requirements, and
surveillance limitations.148 As of mid-March 2017, the bill was
being considered by a designated congressional committee.149
Whether through this bill or one like it, congressional action is
the necessary first step toward protecting the privacy interests
of Americans from the new threat presented by civilian drones.
B.

Revised Rulemaking by the FAA

Once given clear regulatory authority, the FAA should
issue privacy rules governing small civilian drones. The privacy
provisions in the new regulatory scheme should include
comprehensive standards that focus separately on drone
manufacturers and end users.
1. Provisions Focused on Developers and Manufacturers
An effective new regulatory scheme must focus on
privacy practices of drone developers and manufacturers
because the risk of individual hackers will be lower if drone
developers comply with strict regulatory standards that require
encryption or other protections. As an initial matter, to effectively
regulate drone manufacturers, the FAA should develop a tiered
system for drones based on their size and capabilities. Weighted
values should be assigned to different variables that are
considered, with more weight placed on the variables most
closely correlated with potential privacy threats, such as data
acquisition ability, data storage capacity, and flight range.
Based on the weighted average of these variables, which should
be unambiguous to drone developers, each new drone developed
would fall into a single risk category. The minimum-security
standards for new drones would then be assigned based on risk
category. Once published, this risk scale should enable drone
developers and manufacturers to clearly understand the
regulatory standards applicable to their aircrafts. These
standards might include limitations on the amount of data drones
are authorized to store, restrictions on the types of data drones
may collect, and the types of disclosure drone operators are
required to provide.
Id.
S. 631: Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2017, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s631 [https://perma.cc/DC4F-SB4L].
148
149
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The vulnerability of civilian drones to hackers and the
potentially large quantities of private data that could be
misappropriated as a result underscore the need for a regulatory
provision requiring drone developers to install antihacking
security software. In 2014, the research arm of the Pentagon
revealed that it had built a drone equipped with software called
High Assurance Cyber Military Systems, a program that protects
the drone against all forms of cyber attack.150
While such impenetrable software likely will not be
commercially available for use in civilian drones in the near
future, software has been privately developed that can
drastically reduce the risk of hacking by preventing the most
common types of attacks.151 A video posted online by Galois—a
new technology research and development company—illustrated
the functionality of such software by demonstrating how easily
an ordinary drone can be hacked and then demonstrating the
inability of the same hacking techniques to gain control of a
comparable drone with Galois software installed.152 Such
software could drastically reduce the threat posed by drone
hackers, as it would thwart all but the most skilled hackers and
consequently, protect the data of millions of Americans.
Mandatory antihacking software legislation would be a novel
concept but not wholly unheard of; there have been other federal
cybersecurity laws passed recently, such as the Cybersecurity
Act of 2015153 that highlight the U.S. government’s recognition of
the importance of the issue.
In addition to an antihacking software installation
requirement, the FAA’s drone regulations should mandate that
manufacturers and developers include provisions limiting the
amount of data that any particular drone can store and the
types of data it can acquire. These limitations should be largely
based on the intended functionality of different drone models,
restricting data collection that falls outside the scope of the
drone’s intended use, and capping data storage volume based
on industry benchmarks. Additionally, as mentioned by EPIC
150 See Kris Osborn, DARPA Unveils Hack-Proof Drone, DEFENSE TECH (May
21, 2014), https://www.defensetech.org/2014/05/21/darpa-unveils-hack-proof-drone/ [https://
perma.cc/7ASF-XN96].
151 See Betsy Lillian, Galois Develops Anti-hacking Software for Commercial
UAVs, UNMANNED AERIAL ONLINE (Mar. 9, 2015), http://unmanned-aerial.com/galoisdevelops-anti-hacking-software-for-commercial-uavs/ [https://perma.cc/JZ5Q-X5EZ].
152 Galois, Inc., Quadcopter Vulnerabilities and “Hack-Proof” UAV Software,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&
v=uMB10QCxudY.
153 See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. N,
129 Stat. 2242, 2935 (2015).
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in its public comment to the FAA, there should be a time limit
placed on a drone’s data retention so that data is not stored
longer than necessary to serve its purpose.154 Provisions covering
drone manufacturers are only a starting point—to comprehensively
protect the privacy interests of millions of Americans, the FAA’s
revised regulations will need to cover drone operators as well.
2. Provisions Focused on End Users
In addition to provisions that target manufacturers, the
regulations should include comprehensive regulatory provisions
focused on regulating the conduct of end users and potential
drone hackers. These provisions will require a balancing of
interests including a consideration of existing state privacy laws
and First Amendment protections. There are certain provisions
for which the consistency of the federal law is indisputably
necessary including strict antihacking provisions and an absolute
ban on flying drones near private residences or in certain areas
where sensitive information is stored (“no fly zones”).
Turning first to provisions targeting end users, flying
within a specified proximity above or near private residences
should be expressly forbidden to prevent unauthorized data
collection. Prohibiting drone users from obtaining sensitive data
would, in turn, reduce the exposure of this data to potential
hackers. Without such a prohibition, there will undoubtedly be an
increase in self-help, such as that exemplified by a Kentucky man
who recently shot down a drone that was recording video near his
residence.155 Alternatively, consumers can avoid this type of selfhelp through the use of residential geofencing, which creates a
virtual wall around certain pre-set geographic boundaries using
GPS technology.156 One drone company, DJI, has developed an
innovative mechanism that would help facilitate this
prohibition—an application that shows drone operators restricted
areas surrounded by geofencing in real time.157
In addition to protecting against residential privacy
violations, the FAA’s regulations should expand the number of
prohibited airspace locations listed by the federal government,
See EPIC Comments, supra note 7, at 15.
See Mike Wehner, Kentucky Man Shoots Down Drone Spying on 16-YearOld Daughter, DAILY DOT (July 30, 2015), http://www.dailydot.com/technology/
kentucky-drone-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/V9RC-G9BN].
156 See Jason Fitzpatrick, What Is “Geofencing”?, HOW-TO-GEEK (July 1, 2015),
http://www.howtogeek.com/221077/htg-explains-what-geofencing-is-and-why-you-shouldbe-using-it [https://perma.cc/LDV5-2P95].
157 See DJI Introduces New Geofencing System for Its Drones, DJI (Nov. 18,
2015), http://www.dji.com/newsroom/news/dji-fly-safe-system [https://perma.cc/R9AX-LF6C].
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to ensure the protection of private information. The FAA already
prohibits the use of airspace above certain locations across the
United States, such as the airspace surrounding significant
government buildings and financial institutions,158 but vastly
increasing the size of this list specifically for drones would be an
important measure to prevent the capture of confidential
information that could pose a threat to our nation’s security. In
any event, provisions covering end users would be an important
component of any regulatory regime that would effectively protect
against the unique privacy threats presented by civilian drones.
It will also be important for new regulations to focus on
the harmful actors, drone hackers. Just as thieves choose to
steal despite it being a criminal act, there will inevitably be
malicious individuals who attempt to hack into drones and
steal information, regardless of the penalty for the offense.
Although it may not impede those who are averse to the law, a
strict antihacking provision would serve as a necessary deterrent
for the ordinary hobbyist. Of course, the penalties will vary wildly
with the magnitude of the offense and the significance of any
misappropriated data, but must be severe enough to send a clear
message. The sentencing regime for drone hacking should be
modeled after existing statutes, such as the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (CFAA).159 As with most crimes, repeat offenders
should face an enhanced sentence, which could be based on a
multitude of circumstances including the intent behind the
attack, any property damage caused, or the volume of data stolen.
For example, the CFAA provides for a maximum sentence of oneyear imprisonment for a first-time computer hacker who obtains
financial records, information from a United States agency, or
information from a protected computer, but a maximum sentence
of five-years for a first-time offender who commits fraud for
financial gain of more than $5000.160
While a strict sentencing regime should undoubtedly be
imposed to effectively deter civilian drone hacking, individual
circumstances will inevitably require significant sentencing
variance. Absent a strong deterrent, the relative simplicity of
hacking into a drone’s GPS system using the spoofing technique
would likely make it attractive for experimentation to many
curious minds.

158 TFR List, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://tfr.faa.gov/tfr2/list.html [https://perma.
cc/7Y86-BX6D].
159 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
160 Id. § (c)(2)(A), (c)(3)(A).
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CONCLUSION
With the age of civilian drones now upon us, the only
certainty is that change is unavoidable. Technological change
of this magnitude has the potential to foster significant societal
development if the United States adequately prepares for it by
taking a proactive regulatory approach.
With their lack of privacy protections, existing drone
regulations have left a dangerous void in United States law that
could lead to privacy invasions and security threats on an
unprecedented scale. The privacy threats presented by civilian
drones are multifaceted and largely stem from their advanced
technological capabilities, their proliferation under the new
regulatory regime, and their vulnerability to hackers. To
effectively reduce these threats, Congress must act quickly to
mandate that the FAA regulate drone privacy. Then, under a new
congressional mandate, the FAA must consider the input of many
affected stakeholders in issuing comprehensive civilian drone
privacy regulations. Absent such legal intervention, many of the
negative consequences will inevitably become a reality. By
developing comprehensive privacy protections at a federal level,
the United States government can avoid stumbling out of the
gate, and instead, embrace this impending wave of innovation.
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